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MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND  
NOSY NEIGHBOR STATES 
ALEX KREIT* 
Abstract: As more states proceed with marijuana legalization laws, questions 
have arisen about how to accommodate those states that wish to retain prohi-
bition. For instance, in 2014, Oklahoma and Nebraska unsuccessfully sued 
Colorado based on the spillover effects that Colorado’s marijuana legalization 
law had on its neighboring states. This article asserts that there are several 
reasons why state marijuana legalization laws are unlikely to have a large ef-
fect on neighboring states. First, marijuana is not a previously unobtainable 
good being introduced into the stream of commerce, as it is already available 
through the black market inexpensively. Second, legalization laws have a 
number of restrictions that make it very difficult for sellers to profit from ex-
porting legally produced marijuana across state lines. Prohibition states may 
have reason to worry, however, that illegal marijuana growers will be better 
able to hide their operations in legalization states that allow residents to grow 
small amounts of marijuana for personal use, which in turn may increase ille-
gal marijuana exports to neighboring prohibition states. Prohibition states can 
minimize this risk of increased marijuana flow by lobbying the federal gov-
ernment to establish rules that protect their interests. 
INTRODUCTION 
For the better part of the past two decades, the prospect of federal in-
terference has been a pressing concern for state marijuana legalization laws. 
After Californians approved the first modern medical marijuana legalization 
ballot measure in 1996,1 the federal government did all that it could to stop 
the law in its tracks. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents con-
ducted armed raids of medical marijuana collectives2 and federal prosecu-
tors sent some of the operators to prison with lengthy mandatory minimum 
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 1 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). 
 2 AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS, WHAT’S THE COST? THE FEDERAL WAR ON PATIENTS 37 (2013) 
(“Over the past 17 years, the Justice Department has carried out over 500 aggressive SWAT-style 
raids on medical cannabis patients and providers, arrested nearly 400 people, and prosecuted more 
than 160 cases.”). 
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sentences.3 The Department of Justice (DOJ) successfully litigated two 
medical marijuana cases all the way to the Supreme Court. In United States 
v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative in 2001, the Court held that fed-
eral anti-marijuana laws do not recognize a medical necessity defense.4 In 
Gonzales v. Raich in 2005, the Court held it was within the commerce pow-
er for Congress to criminalize intrastate possession and cultivation of small 
amounts of marijuana.5 Federal officials even threatened to yank the DEA-
prescribing license of any doctor that recommended medical marijuana, 
though the Ninth Circuit blocked that plan on free speech grounds.6 
Despite its best efforts, however, the federal government was not able 
to stop the trend. Throughout the 2000s, more and more states passed medi-
cal marijuana laws and marijuana stores started opening faster than the fed-
eral government could shut them down.7 By the time Colorado and Wash-
ington passed the first laws legalizing marijuana for all adult use in 2012, it 
was clear to most observers that the federal government was fighting a los-
ing battle.8 It had the legal authority and resources to be a thorn in the side 
of the states, but it did not have the manpower to prevent states from im-
plementing medical and recreational legalization laws. In recognition of this 
dynamic, the DOJ announced a cease-fire in its war on state-legal marijuana 
in late 2013, in the form of a memorandum advising federal law enforce-
ment officials not to use scarce resources to go after people in compliance 
with state marijuana laws.9 
Just as the threat of federal interference began to subside, however, a 
new problem presented itself: nosy neighbors. In late 2014, Oklahoma and 
Nebraska sued Colorado in the United States Supreme Court, invoking the 
Court’s original jurisdiction over lawsuits between states.10 In their lawsuit, 
Nebraska and Oklahoma described the impact of Colorado’s marijuana le-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See id. at 31 (discussing the case of Bryan Epis, a California medical marijuana patient who 
received a ten-year mandatory minimum federal sentence). 
 4 See 532 U.S. 483, 498–99 (2001). 
 5 See 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
 6 See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that revoking a physi-
cian’s license to prescribe controlled substances based on the physician’s professional recommen-
dation of marijuana would violate the First Amendment). 
 7 See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1463–67 (2009) (arguing 
that the federal government did not succeed in blocking state medical marijuana laws because of 
its limited law enforcement resources). 
 8 See id. (arguing that the federal government does not have sufficient enforcement powers to 
make its federal ban on marijuana effective when states legalize marijuana). 
 9 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. Attorneys, Guid-
ance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo]. 
 10 See Complaint at 1, 4, Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (Dec. 18, 2014) (No. 144), 
2014 WL 7474136 [hereinafter Complaint of Nebraska & Oklahoma]. 
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galization law in dire terms, claiming it was a “direct assault on the health 
and welfare of Plaintiff States’ citizenry.”11 Oklahoma and Nebraska 
claimed that they had experienced “a significant influx of Colorado-sourced 
marijuana” following legalization and asked the Court to strike Colorado’s 
law down under the Supremacy Clause.12 The Supreme Court declined to 
hear the case but its publicity has helped shine a light on an issue that has 
gone under-examined: the horizontal federalism implications of marijuana 
legalization.13 
As more states move forward with marijuana legalization,14 how 
should the law accommodate states that want to retain prohibition? Unde-
terred by Nebraska and Oklahoma’s unsuccessful lawsuit, a group of sher-
iffs from Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado have taken up the cause of trying 
to completely shut down Colorado’s law on preemption grounds.15 Their 
case against the Governor of Colorado is currently before the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, after being dismissed by the District Court.16 Those who 
oppose marijuana legalization in their own states, however, are not limited 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 12, Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. 
Ct. 1034 (Dec. 18, 2014) (No. 144), 2014 WL 7474136 [hereinafter Brief of Nebraska & Oklaho-
ma]. 
 12 Complaint of Nebraska & Oklahoma, supra note 10, at 4, 25. 
 13 Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016) (mem.). In addition to the other con-
tributions to this symposium, on the topic of horizontal federalism and marijuana legalization, see 
generally Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and Legal Obstacles 
to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567 (2015) (discussing the 
effect that the Dormant Commerce Clause may have on state attempts to reduce spillover effects 
from marijuana legalization); Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing in Colo-
rado: Invoking the Supreme Court’s State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-
Legalization Experiment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1829 (2015) (discussing the fact that a market-based 
theory may apply to states calling on the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge state 
marijuana legalization legislation); Brianne J. Gorod, Marijuana Legalization and Horizontal 
Federalism, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 595 (2016) (discussing the importance of the way states go 
about mediating policy disputes and the role of the courts in remedying those disagreements). 
 14 To date, eight states have legalized marijuana. In 2012, Colorado and Washington were the 
first states to pass legalization laws, with Oregon and Alaska following suit in 2014. See COLO. 
CONST. art. XVIII, §16; ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.060 (2015) (codifying Ballot Measure No. 2); 
Control and Regulation of Marijuana Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475B.010–475B.395 (2015); Initia-
tive Measure No. 502, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013) (codified as amended in scattered chap-
ters of Wash. Rev. Code § 69). California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada all passed ballot 
measures legalizing marijuana in November 2016. See Christopher Ingraham, Marijuana Wins Big 
on Election Night, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2016/11/08/medical-marijuana-sails-to-victory-in-florida/ [https://perma.cc/UMN3-
EDDB] (reporting on the election results). In addition to these states, Washington, D.C. has legal-
ized the possession and personal cultivation, although not the commercial distribution, of marijua-
na. See D.C. CODE § 48-904.01 (2015). 
 15 See Smith v. Hickenlooper, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1288 (D. Colo. 2016), appeal filed, No. 
16-1095 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 16 See id. at 1294. 
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to attempting to block them in others. Scholars have argued, for example, 
that courts should “award damages to prevailing sister states, compensating 
them for the injuries inflicted by the incursion of [state-legal] marijuana 
into their territory.”17 Like the Oklahoma and Nebraska lawsuit, this pro-
posal rests on the premise that marijuana legalization will cause a noticea-
ble impact in neighboring states.18 But is that really so? 
This article argues that as currently constituted, state marijuana legali-
zation laws are unlikely to have anything more than a negligible effect on 
neighboring states. There are two main reasons for this. First, marijuana is 
already relatively inexpensive and easy to find in prohibition states. This is 
not a case of a previously unobtainable good being introduced into the 
stream of commerce. With the exception of people who live near the state 
border, most marijuana consumers in Nebraska will continue to get their 
marijuana where they always have: from the Nebraska black market. Sec-
ond, state marijuana legalization laws all share a number of features that 
make it difficult for people to profit from exporting the product across state 
lines. Because of exacting regulatory oversight measures like seed-to-sale 
tracking, there is a very low risk that wholesale quantities of legally pro-
duced marijuana will leak into the black market. At the retail level, states 
strictly limit the amount of marijuana a person can buy to one ounce, with 
the exception of Maine where the limit is 2.5 ounces.19 In fact, the state of 
Colorado originally applied a lower limit for out-of-staters of one quarter of 
an ounce, but this provision was repealed in 2016.20 Given these retail lim-
its, it would be very difficult for sellers to compete with black market prices 
by buying retail amounts of marijuana an ounce at a time in Denver and 
                                                                                                                           
 17 DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 13, at 1840. 
 18 See id. at 1838 (“Just as contaminants released into rivers flow across state lines, marijuana 
introduced into the stream of commerce from Colorado dispensaries will predictably flow into 
neighboring states through the simple expediency of placing lawfully purchased cannabis in vehi-
cles which are then driven across state lines.”). 
 19 See generally NAT’L ALL. FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS, MARIJUANA: COMPARISON OF 
STATE LAWS LEGALIZING PERSONAL, NON-MEDICAL USE (2016) [hereinafter Comparison of 
State Laws] (noting a 28.5 gram limit in California, which is approximately one ounce, a one 
ounce limit in Colorado, a 2.5 ounce limit in Maine, a one ounce limit in Massachusetts, a one 
ounce limit in Nevada, a one ounce limit in Oregon with a higher limit of eight ounces within a 
residence, and a one ounce limit in Washington state). 
 20 See Ricardo Baca, Tourists Visiting Colorado Can Now Buy a Lot More Weed Than They 
Ever Could Before, THE CANNABIST (June 15, 2016), http://www.thecannabist.co/2016/06/15/
tourists-colorado-buy-weed/56244/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20160617134013/http://www.the
cannabist.co/2016/06/15/tourists-colorado-buy-weed/56244/] (reporting on the change in Colora-
do’s law). For a discussion of the constitutionality of laws that treat residents and visitors differ-
ently with respect to the amount of marijuana they can buy, see Brannon P. Denning, One Toke 
Over the (State) Line: Constitutional Limits on “Pot Tourism” Restrictions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2279 
(2014). 
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transporting it to Omaha. This is not to say the impact of current state legal-
ization laws on marijuana use in neighboring states is zero. But there is little 
reason to believe it is or will be “substantial.”21 
Part I begins by rebutting the claim that there is evidence legally pro-
duced marijuana is being diverted from legalization states for sale else-
where.22 Part I then discusses in more detail why existing state legalization 
laws are unlikely to result in anything remotely approaching a significant 
increase in marijuana use or availability in neighboring states.23 Finally, 
Part I briefly examines the conditions that could give prohibition states a 
legitimate reason to worry about being flooded with marijuana that was le-
gally produced in other states—namely, a sharp reduction in the retail price 
of marijuana in legalization states in combination with a legalization law 
that did not strictly regulate the supply chain or cap the amount of marijua-
na that can be sold at retail.24 Part II discusses why some states that have 
legalized marijuana might, counter intuitively, attract illegal marijuana 
growers.25 Although a rise in illegal growers might result in an increase in 
illegal marijuana exports to prohibition states, this is a much different prob-
lem than that of diversion, and one that has a much smaller impact on the 
marijuana market in prohibition states. In the case of diversion, legalization 
states stand to benefit from sales destined for prohibition states, through tax 
revenues, legal marijuana jobs, and so forth. By contrast, illegal marijuana 
cultivation harms the states where the growers set up shop as much as the 
states where the marijuana is consumed. 
I. WHY CURRENT LEGALIZATION LAWS ARE UNLIKELY  
TO IMPACT NEIGHBORS 
A. Claims of Widespread Smuggling, but No Evidence 
States have slowly but steadily legalized marijuana since the passage 
of California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996—for medical use only at 
first and, beginning in 2012, for all adult use.26 For the most part, state ma-
rijuana reforms have been met with a shrug from their neighbors. There 
have been occasional reports of police in prohibition states discovering ma-
                                                                                                                           
 21 Complaint of Nebraska & Oklahoma, supra note 10, at 25. 
 22 See infra notes 26–60 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 61–88 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 95–125 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 UC Davis L. Rev. 
617, 620-24 (2016) (providing a brief history of state marijuana legalization efforts).   
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rijuana that had been legally purchased elsewhere.27 Also, there have been 
longstanding concerns about marijuana being diverted from the gray market 
under California’s almost completely unregulated (until recently) medical 
marijuana law.28 But there was nothing to suggest that state legalization 
laws were of much concern to elected officials outside of their own borders. 
This changed in December 2014, when Nebraska and Oklahoma sued 
Colorado over its marijuana legalization law in the United States Supreme 
Court, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction over cases between states.29 
Nebraska and Oklahoma alleged that Colorado’s law was causing them “a 
direct and significant detrimental impact—namely the diversion of limited 
manpower and resources to arrest and process suspected and convicted fel-
ons involved in the increased illegal marijuana trafficking or transporta-
tion.”30 According to Nebraska and Oklahoma’s complaint, their police of-
ficers had seen “a significant influx of Colorado-sourced marijuana.”31 The 
complaint did not provide a basis for this allegation or any data about sei-
zures of Colorado-sourced marijuana. The closest the complaint got to 
spelling out the nature of the threat that Colorado marijuana posed was its 
allegation that Nebraska and Oklahoma police “encountere[d] marijuana on 
a regular basis as part of day-to-day duties,” including during “routine stops 
of individuals who possess marijuana purchased in Colorado which, at the 
time of purchase, complied with [Colorado law].”32 In sum, according to the 
complaint, “[t]he detrimental economic impacts of Colorado Amendment 
64 on the Plaintiff States, especially in regard to the increased costs for the 
apprehension, incarceration, and prosecution of suspected and convicted 
felons, are substantial.”33 
The legal support for Nebraska and Oklahoma’s lawsuit against Colo-
rado was the Supremacy Clause; the pair of prohibition states argued that by 
legalizing marijuana, Colorado had created an obstacle to the enforcement 
of federal prohibition and so its law should be struck down as preempted.34 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See North Dakota v. Kuruc, 846 N.W.2d 314, 325 (N.D. 2014) (holding that the defend-
ants’ “Washington medical marijuana prescriptions may not be used as an absolute defense” in 
North Dakota to possession or possession with the intent to deliver). 
 28 See Erika Lewis, SB 1262: California Hashes Out Medical Marijuana Industry Regulation 
and Dispenses Greater Scrutiny of Physician Recommendations, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 273, 
277–80 (2014) (discussing the absence of statewide medical marijuana regulations in California). 
California finally enacted the Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act to regulate medical 
marijuana businesses in 2015. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 19300–19360 (West 2015). 
 29 See Complaint of Nebraska & Oklahoma, supra note 10, at 1. 
 30 Id. at 27. 
 31 Id. at 25. 
 32 Id. at 26. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Brief of Nebraska & Oklahoma, supra note 11, at 22–27. 
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The preemption question has been litigated in a handful of state courts, with 
most agreeing that the federal Controlled Substances Act does not preempt 
state medical and adult use marijuana legalization laws.35 Without digress-
ing too far beyond the focus of this article, very briefly, the reasoning be-
hind these rulings has been that nothing about state legalization laws pre-
vents the federal government from enforcing its own ban on marijuana.36 
Removing state penalties for marijuana possession and sale may make it 
harder to enforce prohibition, but only because the federal government can 
no longer rely on state resources to help it with the task. And refusing to 
help the federal government accomplish its goals cannot constitute an ob-
stacle for preemption purposes because the anti-commandeering principle 
makes it unconstitutional for the federal government to conscript states into 
enforcing federal law.37 Nebraska and Oklahoma disagree with this posi-
tion, of course, but their lawsuit against Colorado came to an end before it 
even truly began when the Supreme Court declined to grant review.38 
That the Supreme Court declined to hear Nebraska and Oklahoma’s 
lawsuit does not mean there is no merit to their claims of harm. Indeed, the 
idea that legalizing marijuana in one state would result in an influx of the 
substance into other states would seem to be a matter of common sense. 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1230 (D.N.M. 2016) (hold-
ing that “[s]tate medical marijuana laws that provide limited state-law immunity may not conflict 
with [the Controlled Substances Act]” but “[t]o affirmatively require [employers] to accommo-
date” employee’s marijuana use would be preempted); White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mari-
copa Cty., 386 P.3d 416, 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that the Controlled Substances Act 
did not preempt Arizona’s medical marijuana law under obstacle preemption because it “[did] not 
prevent the United States from enforcing federal law, but instead provide[d] a limited state-law 
immunity”); Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Mich. 2014) (holding that 
Michigan’s medical marijuana law was not preempted because it did not “purport to alter the [fed-
eral criminalization of marijuana], or to interfere with or undermine federal enforcement of [the 
federal Controlled Substances Act]”). But see Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor 
& Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or. 2010) (holding that although state laws that merely exempt peo-
ple from punishment for marijuana activity are not preempted, “to the extent that [the statute] 
affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana, federal law preempts that subsection, leav-
ing it ‘without effect’”) (citation omitted). 
 36 See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under 
the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 27–28 (2013) (“Neither do state 
officials somehow violate federal law when, pursuant to state law, they refuse to lift a finger 
against marijuana.”). But see Denning, supra note 13, at 580 (“At the risk of seeming obtuse, I 
find it self-evident that state legalization regimes permitting marijuana use for medical or recrea-
tional purposes present a substantial obstacle to the implementation of a federal law that (1) rec-
ognizes no medical use for marijuana and (2) seeks to eliminate the national market in marijuana 
by banning all production, possession, and transfer.”). 
 37 See Mikos, supra note 36, at 15–17 (discussing the relationship between the anti-
commandeering doctrine, preemption, and state marijuana legalization laws). 
 38 For an overview of the lawsuit and the Supreme Court’s decision not to hear it, see Gorod, 
supra note 13, at 607–14. 
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After all, in contrast to “other state vice-legalization experiments such as 
gambling, prostitution, and prize-fighting,” marijuana legalization laws “au-
thorize[] the trafficking of goods that can easily cross state lines . . . .”39 It 
would seem only natural that “marijuana introduced into the stream of 
commerce from Colorado dispensaries will predictably flow into neighbor-
ing states . . . .”40 Before long, a prohibition state bordering a legalization 
state may “find[] itself awash in marijuana purchased legally [in the legali-
zation state] then brought back into the [prohibition] state.”41 To the extent 
increased marijuana use results in increases of public health and law en-
forcement costs,42 one state’s marijuana legalization law might impose a 
genuine burden in neighboring states, just as Nebraska and Oklahoma 
claimed. 
Nebraska and Oklahoma’s complaint was short on details with respect 
to the “increased costs” they claimed they were suffering as a result of Col-
orado’s law.43 They alleged that police in both states had seen an uptick in 
arrests of people in possession of marijuana that had originated in Colora-
do.44 The two states, however, did not say how many of these arrests they 
had made or how much Colorado-sourced marijuana they had seized. 
Although Nebraska and Oklahoma’s complaint provided few details, 
some commentators have argued that the available evidence suggests that 
“large quantities of Colorado cannabis are now being diverted into” other 
states.45 The statistical data in support of this claim comes from the Rocky 
Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (“HIDTA”) task force—an 
entity whose continued existence and federal funding stream is contingent 
in substantial part on the extent of the “drug trafficking threat” in its juris-
diction.46 
                                                                                                                           
 39 DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 13, at 1837–38. 
 40 Id. at 1838. 
 41 Denning, supra note 13, at 583. 
 42 See Chad DeVeaux, One Toke Too Far: The Demise of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s 
Extraterritorial Doctrine Threatens the Marijuana Legalization Experiment, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 27–28) (arguing that increased marijuana use results in in-
creased public health costs). 
 43 Complaint of Nebraska & Oklahoma, supra note 10, at 26. 
 44 See id. 
 45 DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 13, at 1839. 
 46 21 U.S.C. § 1706(i)(2)(A) (2012) (outlining the process for HIDTA program budget sub-
missions and requiring the submission of a budget justification that explains, among other factors, 
“the reasons for the proposed funding level [and] how such funding level was determined based 
on a current assessment of the drug trafficking threat in each high intensity drug trafficking area”); 
see 21 U.S.C. § 1706(d) (outlining factors that determine whether to designate an area of the Unit-
ed States as a high intensity drug trafficking area); DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 13, at 
1857–59 (discussing Rocky Mountain HIDTA studies of Colorado’s marijuana law). 
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The findings in the Rocky Mountain HIDTA’s most recent report on 
Colorado’s legalization law sound pretty damning at first blush. According 
to the Rocky Mountain HIDTA, “[h]ighway patrol interdiction seizures of 
Colorado marijuana” rose thirty-seven percent between 2013 and 2015.47 
Also in 2015, officers seized “marijuana from Colorado” bound for thirty-
six different states.48 Finally, according to the report, “[i]n the three years 
(2013-2015) of legalized recreational marijuana in Colorado, highway pa-
trol seizures have resulted in approximately 4.5 tons of Colorado marijuana 
being seized.”49 These numbers paint a picture of Colorado as “a principal 
gateway through which marijuana enters the black markets of other 
states.”50 Upon closer inspection, however, the HIDTA report findings tell 
us almost nothing about the impact of Colorado’s legalization law on other 
states. 
First, and most importantly, even though the figures in the Rocky 
Mountain HIDTA report are contained in a chapter titled “Diversion of Col-
orado Marijuana,”51 the report does not distinguish between Colorado mari-
juana that was legally grown but diverted and marijuana that was illegally 
grown. This is a critical flaw that renders HIDTA’s findings effectively 
worthless. State legalization laws, including Colorado’s, do not make it le-
gal for any resident to grow an unlimited amount of marijuana without 
over-sight; only state licensees who abide by detailed regulations designed 
to prevent diversion and ensure product safety can legally grow more than a 
personal use amount of the plant. Marijuana that was legally grown in Colo-
rado but diverted can be properly attributed to Colorado’s legalization law. 
Marijuana that was illegally grown in Colorado and shipped elsewhere can-
not because it was against Colorado’s legalization law to grow it. Yet, in the 
report, all of it is classified as “Colorado marijuana.” The phrase seems de-
signed to mislead readers into concluding that the 4.5 tons of Colorado ma-
rijuana interdicted between 2013 and 2015 was legally produced under Col-
orado’s legalization law, then diverted, and then seized en route to other 
states. In reality, however, it seems likely almost all of the Colorado mariju-
ana described in the Rocky Mountain HIDTA report was illegally grown, 
and so not a product of Colorado’s legalization law. 
                                                                                                                           
 47 ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THE LEGALIZATION OF 
MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE IMPACT 109 (2016) [hereinafter LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA 
IN COLORADO]. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 111. 
 50 DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 13, at 1858. 
 51 LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, supra note 47, at 109 (emphasis added). 
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It is impossible to tell from the data in the HIDTA report just how 
much, if any, of the Colorado marijuana it discusses was legally grown and 
then diverted. The report’s anecdotal accounts suggest most of the Colorado 
marijuana interdicted by other states was as illegal to grow in Colorado as it 
would have been to grow in Nebraska or Oklahoma. None of the sixteen 
examples contained in a section of the report titled “A Few Examples of 
Interdiction,” for example, claim that the interdicted marijuana was legally 
produced in Colorado.52 The report’s silence on this point speaks vol-
umes—if any of the seizures had involved marijuana that the police thought 
was legally grown in Colorado, surely that fact would have been noted. Al-
so telling, in the report’s examples in a separate section on investigations 
into Colorado marijuana, the only one to claim diversion of legally pro-
duced marijuana is of dubious quality. The report states that “an eye wit-
ness” saw a “young man walk[] happily out the front door of [a] medical 
marijuana dispensary with one entire pound of marijuana in his hand.”53 If 
diversion of legally produced marijuana were at all widespread, presumably 
HIDTA’s report would include more than this single unsubstantiated exam-
ple. 
Of course, HIDTA’s data still appears to show that seizures of marijua-
na grown in Colorado and bound for other states increased following legali-
zation. If Colorado’s legalization law is not responsible for this phenome-
non, then what is? Two possible explanations that have nothing to do with 
Colorado’s law present themselves. First, after Colorado legalized marijua-
na, some police officers in neighboring states have been profiling cars with 
Colorado license plates in order to hunt for marijuana.54 Kansas police of-
ficers have gone so far as to argue (unsuccessfully) before the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals that a driver’s “status as a resident of Colorado” gave 
them cause to search his car “because Colorado is ‘known to be home to 
medical marijuana dispensaries.’”55 The increase in interdicted Colorado 
marijuana observed in the HIDTA data could simply reflect the fact that 
out-of-state police have been stopping and searching a larger number of 
drivers with Colorado license plates following passage of the state’s legali-
zation law. In other words, the thirty-seven percent increase in “[h]ighway 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. at 113–15. 
 53 Id. at 121. 
 54 See, e.g., Michael Roberts, Stop Pot Profiling by Colorado License Plate, Court Tells Kan-
sas Troopers, WESTWORD (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.westword.com/news/stop-pot-profiling-
by-colorado-license-plate-court-tells-kansas-troopers-8239472 [https://perma.cc/X8H4-BRNX]. 
 55 Vasquez v. Lewis, 834 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016). The Court stated that “it is time 
to abandon the pretense that state citizenship is a permissible basis upon which to justify the de-
tention and search of out-of-state motorists, and time to stop the practice of detention of motorists 
for nothing more than an out-of-state license plate.” Id. at 1138. 
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patrol interdiction seizures of Colorado marijuana”56 between 2013 and 
2015 does not necessarily mean there was a thirty-seven percent increase in 
Colorado marijuana being transported into other states, or indeed any in-
crease at all. The numbers could just as easily have resulted from changed 
police practices and reflect an increase in stops and searches of cars with 
Colorado license plates.57 
Second, the increase in reported seizures of “Colorado marijuana” 
might reflect an increase in the reporting of seizures rather than an increase 
in actual seizures. The HIDTA report states that its data is derived from “in-
terdiction seizures [that] are reported on a voluntary basis.”58 It is possible 
that law enforcement groups have been taking greater care to report a higher 
percentage of their seizures of Colorado-sourced marijuana after legaliza-
tion, perhaps in part because of encouragement from the Rocky Mountain 
HIDTA itself. In the first Rocky Mountain HIDTA report on marijuana le-
galization in Colorado in 2013, the group openly acknowledged that it had 
“contacted some law enforcement entities and requested voluntary reporting 
on those instances in which Colorado marijuana was seized in their jurisdic-
tion.”59 With HIDTA itself actively working to encourage more reporting of 
Colorado marijuana seizures, there is every reason to think the purported 
rise in seizures is at least partially due to more reporting and not more seiz-
ing. 
In sum, the data cited as evidence that Colorado’s marijuana legaliza-
tion law is having a significant impact in other states does not support the 
claim. The Rocky Mountain HIDTA’s findings do not even establish that 
there has been a significant increase in the amount of marijuana being ex-
ported from Colorado to other states, let alone that there is anything more 
                                                                                                                           
 56 LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, supra note 47, at 109. 
 57 Drug arrest rates are just as likely to reflect policing practices as offense prevalence. This is 
because, unlike most other offenses, drug investigations are almost always police-initiated. A 
typical robbery investigation begins when the victim reports the crime to the police, but “drug 
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the War on Drugs in the 1990s, HARM REDUCTION J., Feb. 2006, at 4. 
 58 LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, supra note 47, at 109 (emphasis added). 
 59 ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THE LEGALIZATION OF 
MARIJUANA IN COLORADO: THE IMPACT: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 37 (2013). 
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than a negligible amount of marijuana that was legally grown in Colorado 
being diverted elsewhere. 
In fairness to the claim that state legalization laws impact neighbors, 
there have been credible reports of people taking personal use amounts of 
marijuana across state lines.60 It is not at all surprising that some of the tour-
ists who visit a legalization state and buy marijuana there might take lefto-
vers back home with them. Unlike the diversion of large quantities of mari-
juana for distribution, however, tourists returning to their state with small 
amounts of marijuana have an insignificant impact on marijuana use rates 
and black market prices. In addition, although it is possible that illegal mari-
juana growing has increased in states with legalization laws, as discussed 
below that is a much different problem than the widespread diversion of 
marijuana that was grown legally under state law. 
B. Black Market Marijuana: Available and Affordable 
As discussed above, there is not much evidence that significant quanti-
ties of legally produced marijuana are being diverted into other states. This 
might seem counterintuitive, but when one considers the easy availability of 
black market marijuana, along with the rules that are in place to prevent 
diversion in marijuana legalization states, it soon becomes clear that it 
would be tough to build a drug empire by smuggling legally produced mari-
juana into other states. 
Marijuana use had been widespread in the United States long before 
states began passing legalization laws. Indeed, the failure of marijuana pro-
hibition to reduce marijuana purity, price, and use rates is frequently cited 
as an argument for legalization.61 According to the National Survey on Drug 
Use and Health, as of 2013, 19.8 million Americans (7.5 percent of people 
over the age of twelve) were current marijuana users, defined as those who 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See, e.g., LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, supra note 47, at 122 (reporting 
that in January 2016, Nebraska police had “booked 23 possession of marijuana cases coming from 
Colorado” and implying that at least some of these cases involved “[l]icensed dispensary prod-
ucts”). 
 61 See, e.g., INT’L CTR. FOR SCI. IN DRUG POLICY, TOOLS FOR DEBATE: US FEDERAL GOV-
ERNMENT DATA ON CANNABIS PROHIBITION 21 (2010) [hereinafter DATA ON CANNABIS PROHI-
BITION] (arguing that “[g]iven that cannabis prohibition has clearly failed to achieve its stated 
objectives and has also resulted in a range of serious unintended harms, regulatory models should 
be given urgent consideration”). Indeed, a similar argument is often made against the drug war 
more broadly. See, e.g., Charles H. Whitebread, Freeing Ourselves from the Prohibition Idea in 
the Twenty-First Century, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 235, 246 (2000) (arguing that “[t]he war on 
drugs has failed” in part because despite “substantial federal spending to combat drugs, the num-
ber of casual and serious drug abusers has remained constant”). 
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use marijuana at least once a month.62 Of these, 8.1 million were daily or 
near-daily marijuana users.63 
With so many marijuana users in the United States, it should come as no 
surprise that marijuana is both relatively inexpensive and readily available 
despite prohibition laws. Regarding price, “even at today’s illicit-market pric-
es, being stoned costs an occasional user without a developed tolerance to 
THC less than $1 per hour.”64 At these prices, a relatively heavy user—
someone in “the top 10 percent of monthly users”—spends about the same 
amount on their marijuana habit as a “pack-and-a-half-a-day cigarette smoker 
paying Vermont retail prices spends on tobacco.”65 Marijuana is also widely 
available, even for the group that prohibition is most intended to protect: 
minors. This is evidenced by the fact that “over the last 30 years of cannabis 
prohibition the drug has remained ‘almost universally available to American 
12th graders,’ with approximately 80–90% saying the drug is ‘very easy’ or 
‘fairly easy’ to obtain.”66 
In sum, states that make marijuana legal are not introducing a previ-
ously unobtainable good into the stream of commerce, or even one that is 
especially hard to get. They are attempting to replace a vast existing illegal 
black market in their states with a legal market. To be sure, even though 
black market marijuana is already easy to get and not especially expensive, 
legalization could result in significantly reduced prices, depending on how 
it is implemented.67 And, depending on how far prices drop, it could one 
day become worthwhile for black market entrepreneurs to smuggle mariju-
ana that was legally produced in one state into a prohibition state.68 
So far, however, the retail price of legally produced marijuana is not 
much less than the going rate on the black market and in many places it is 
higher. For example, one 2016 survey of sixty-six large cities in six states 
found that “only four cities have less expensive legal marijuana than black 
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ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 1 (2014). 
 63 Id. 
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market marijuana” and in 52 of the cities surveyed, black market marijuana 
was at least 10% cheaper than legal marijuana.69 This fact might seem 
strange because one of the goals of legalization is to eliminate the black 
market. There are a number of reasons marijuana prices have remained rela-
tively high under current legalization laws, however, including the cost of 
complying with extensive regulations,70 the difficulty in achieving econo-
mies of scale quickly and in a single-state market,71 and a federal tax penal-
ty that applies to marijuana businesses because of its status as a Schedule I 
controlled substance.72 By contrast, the black market has “virtually no over-
head costs other than the product itself.”73 Of course, black market opera-
tors face the threat of arrest and prosecution that also makes it hard for them 
to enforce contractual agreements, achieve the benefits of large-scale manu-
facturing processes, and so on. Over time, this should allow the legal mar-
ket to undercut the black market even with heavy regulation and high taxes. 
For now at least, legally sold marijuana is priced similarly to the black mar-
ket stuff. Until that changes, smuggling it into other states for sale would be 
a money loser, not a moneymaker. 
Very recently, it appears legal marijuana prices have finally begun to 
fall, at least in both Colorado and Washington.74 As discussed below, how-
ever, even if the price of legally produced marijuana were much lower than 
it is today, the structure of existing state legalization laws would still make 
it very difficult to run a profitable smuggling business. 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Sean Williams, The Great Marijuana Mystery That’s Likely to Leave Investors Disappointed, 
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 71 Id. at 78 (“[A]s time goes on, as legal operators learn and become efficient, and as they 
expand and achieve economies of scale, their costs can drop dramatically.”). 
 72 I.R.C. § 280E (2012); see Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 
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C. How Current Legalization Laws Make Diversion Unlikely 
With marijuana already available and relatively affordable in the black 
market, it is not possible to make easy money simply by driving to Seattle, 
buying marijuana at a retail store, and bringing it back to Missoula. Instead, 
would-be smugglers would need to be able to undercut the black market 
rate to make a business out of diverting legally produced marijuana to other 
states. The way state legalization laws have been set up so far, however, 
makes this very tough to do. 
The most obvious possibility for undercutting the black market by 
smuggling legally produced marijuana out-of-state would be to buy it in 
bulk. If the wholesale price of legally produced marijuana were to fall sub-
stantially below the wholesale price of black market marijuana, smuggling 
could become rampant—that is, if smugglers could get their hands on legal-
ly produced marijuana at wholesale prices. Thus far, the states that have 
passed legalization laws make this difficult to impossible. State legalization 
laws tightly regulate and control the marijuana production and distribution 
process. This may be due in part to the fact that the DOJ’s non-enforcement 
guidelines suggest that “[p]reventing the diversion of marijuana from states 
where it is legal under state law in some form to other states” is one of the 
actions that states must do to avoid federal interference.75 
Whatever the impetus, state legalization laws provide a great deal of 
protection against the diversion of wholesale amounts of marijuana. Most 
notably, the four states that have already implemented marijuana legaliza-
tion—Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington—all require “seed-to-
sale” tracking of the product.76 The legalization laws in California, Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Nevada, which were passed by voters in 2016, have not 
yet been implemented with respect to marijuana manufacture and retail sale. 
The system in Colorado provides an example. Colorado Department of 
Revenue regulations require seed-to-sale tracking, “formally called Mariju-
ana Inventory Tracking Solution (‘MITS’).”77 In the MITS system,  
                                                                                                                           
 75 Cole Memo, supra note 9, at 1. 
 76 See Margaret Chon, Tracermarks: A Proposed Information Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 
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Every plant in the market must be individually tagged and tracked 
as it moves through the commercial growth and distribution chain 
. . . . As each plant moves through the cultivation process, the tag 
stays with it from stage to stage. Eventually, flower is harvested 
and plants are combined to make batches. Cultivation facilities 
batch product by combining MITS tag numbers so that the prod-
uct in any container or retail product can be traced by the batch 
number to see which plants are included.78  
Through this process, the “system offers the state the ability to track 
product in ways that far surpass product tracking in most other commodity 
markets in the U.S.”79 As a result, the chances that legally grown marijuana 
will be diverted out of state before it reaches the consumer are incredibly 
low.80 In addition to seed-to-sale tracking, the prospect of stiff federal pen-
alties for a licensed producer caught diverting marijuana adds to the safe-
guards against wholesale diversion.81 
The regulations to monitor the supply chain of legal marijuana com-
pare very favorably to another product where diversion is a concern: guns. 
As one scholar recently observed, “[w]hile the federal government and forty 
states (including Colorado) have declined to mandate security measures for 
retail gun dealers, the Colorado constitution and regulations adopted pursu-
ant thereto require security measures for recreational marijuana retailers.”82 
Of course, diverting marijuana from the grower or wholesaler is not 
the only way for legally produced marijuana to make its way into other 
states. After marijuana is sold at retail, the state is unable to track its move-
ments. What is there to stop an enterprising Nebraskan from driving to Col-
orado and buying a large amount of retail marijuana to sell back home? 
States that have legalized marijuana have limited the amount consum-
ers can purchase and possess to one ounce, with the exception of Maine 
where the limit is two and a half ounces.83 A one-ounce limit on marijuana 
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purchases makes it very hard for someone to turn a profit smuggling legally 
produced marijuana out of state. Consumers are unable to buy in large 
enough quantities to get a significant discount.84 And, with the retail price 
of marijuana in legalization states similar to the retail price on the black 
market, smuggling non-discounted retail marijuana elsewhere for sale does 
not make much sense.85 Even if the retail price of legal marijuana begins to 
drop, however, it would likely need to fall significantly for this sort of 
smuggling to become a viable business. This is because the cost of travel 
makes it impossible for sellers to profit from transporting smaller quantities 
of marijuana long distances, even if the substance is bought at a substantial 
discount relative to the black market. Two scholars explain this dynamic: 
Suppose two people took 3 days to drive to California from 1,000 
miles away, purchase a wholesale quantity of marijuana, and re-
turn. The direct cost of such a trip might be roughly US $2,000 to 
US $2,500. If the trip involved purchasing and reselling only 5 
pounds, those tangible costs would explain the entire price gradi-
ent. That sets a rough floor on the minimum viable shipment size 
. . . . If the trip involved transporting 50 pounds, then these tangi-
ble costs would amount to only US $40 to US $50 per pound per 
1,000 miles.86 
With marijuana sold in only one-ounce increments, acquiring enough 
marijuana to make smuggling trips worthwhile adds an additional cost and 
additional risk. To acquire five pounds of marijuana (eighty ounces), a per-
son would need to buy from eighty different stores. Groups of smugglers 
working together could make the process more efficient. Still, the one-
ounce limit poses a real barrier to undercutting the black market by smug-
gling retail marijuana, even if and when the retail price drops well below 
the black market price. Making serial purchases of marijuana from multiple 
stores not only adds to the cost in terms of manpower, but it also increases 
the risk of arrest.87 And, of course, for a smuggler of legal marijuana bought 
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at retail to compete with the black market, the cost of the legal retail mari-
juana would need to be competitive with the cost of wholesale black market 
marijuana. 
This brings us, finally, to the case of end-user diversion. It would be 
naïve to think that none of the tourists who visit a legal marijuana state will 
take a little marijuana home with them. Inevitably, some visitors to marijua-
na states will purchase a little extra to take home. This sort of diversion of 
marijuana for personal use, however, will have a negligible effect on public 
health or the black market in other states. As with other intoxicants, the iso-
lated or occasional use of marijuana does not present a public health prob-
lem.88 Likewise, a person who legally buys marijuana in one state to con-
sume back home does not thereby fuel the black market in her home state. 
Indeed, if anything, end-user diversion is likely to reduce the black market 
in the user’s home state. If the buyer is already a marijuana user, the mariju-
ana she bought legally in Colorado may substitute for marijuana she would 
have otherwise purchased on the black market at home. 
D. What Would Make Smuggling Legal Marijuana Profitable? 
As currently constituted, state legalization laws make it very difficult 
to profit by smuggling legally produced marijuana. If state marijuana legal-
ization laws looked more like state liquor laws, however, smuggling could 
become a very lucrative business. 
First, as two scholars explained in a paper written after California’s 
first marijuana legalization ballot measure narrowly failed in 2010, without 
sufficient checks on diversion at the manufacturer or wholesale level, 
“[m]arijuana that is diverted from legal production—even after taxes are 
collected—would undercut current marijuana prices throughout most of the 
United States.”89 If it were possible for producers easily “to sell to brokers 
who claim to be supplying legitimate retail operations inside [a legalization 
state] when in reality they are diverting some to smugglers who (illegally) 
take the marijuana out of state,” then marijuana smuggling would almost 
surely become widespread.90 No system is foolproof and surely there are 
opportunities for diversion at the producer or wholesale level, even with 
seed-to-sale tracking. But so long as strict anti-diversion measures are in 
place, smuggling should be rare. If, however, legalization states decide to 
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begin loosening oversight of the supply chain, that one shift could make 
diversion widespread. 
Second, even if legalization states maintain tight controls on the pro-
duction and distribution of marijuana, widespread diversion could also be-
come a problem if they eliminate or significantly relax the cap on retail pur-
chases and if they do not adopt measures to keep retail prices relatively 
high. Treating marijuana like alcohol is a popular slogan for legalization 
campaigns. If marijuana legalization laws were true to that model, however, 
there would be no limit to how much marijuana a person could buy at retail. 
If legalization states were to move in that direction, consumers might be 
able to get bulk discounts from retailers.91 In addition, being able to buy in 
bulk would dramatically reduce the transaction costs for a would-be smug-
gler. If it were possible to buy five pounds of marijuana at once, instead of 
having to make eighty separate one-ounce purchases, smugglers could ob-
tain marijuana efficiently with little risk. Of course, the price of marijuana 
would also be a significant factor. The retail price of marijuana would likely 
need to fall to around the price of wholesale black market marijuana for 
smuggling large amounts to make sense. Legalization states, however, also 
have a number of tools to keep marijuana prices high.92  
Even if people do begin to smuggle wholesale quantities of legally 
produced marijuana into prohibition states, that fact alone does not neces-
sarily mean prohibition states will suffer much in the way of negative public 
health consequences. There are plenty of marijuana users in prohibition 
states already. It is certainly possible that marijuana smuggling could lower 
prices in a prohibition state without increasing, or at least without signifi-
cantly increasing, use. If use remains steady but users just pay a little bit 
less than they did before, has a prohibition state suffered any damage? This 
is not to say that prohibition states do not have reason to be concerned about 
the possibility that smuggling from a legalization state could lead to a dra-
matic rise in use by its residents, but it is surely not a foregone conclusion. 
Indeed, the jury remains out on the extent to which marijuana use will in-
crease even in states that have adopted legalization laws.93 
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II. LEGALIZATION AND ILLEGAL MARIJUANA GROWERS 
Part I argues that it is unlikely that legally produced marijuana is being 
smuggled out of legalization states for sale elsewhere.94 Despite alarmist 
rhetoric from Nebraska and Oklahoma and from the Rocky Mountain 
HIDTA about Colorado marijuana, there is simply no evidence that whole-
sale quantities of legally grown marijuana are being diverted from legaliza-
tion states into the black market. Moreover, with the price of legal marijua-
na still nearly as much as in the black market, it would be nearly impossible 
to run a profitable business by buying legal marijuana at retail to export to 
prohibition states. In light of this, Nebraska and Oklahoma’s lawsuit against 
Colorado seems to be based more on “political opposition to what Colorado 
is doing within its own borders, rather than genuine concern about the out-
of-state effects of its in-state activities.”95 
Even if state legalization laws continue to be effective at preventing 
against the diversion of legally grown marijuana to other states, however, 
prohibition states might still have a valid reason to be concerned about 
them. This is because there is evidence to suggest illegal marijuana growing 
operations have increased following the passage of legalization laws in at 
least some states.96  
Why would this be? Legalization is meant to eliminate the black mar-
ket. Common sense, not to mention the events following the repeal of alco-
hol prohibition, make clear that legalizing a widely used product will deci-
mate the black market over time.97 With the risk of arrest and prosecution 
no longer priced into the product, legalization usually allows producers to 
operate more efficiently and reduce prices over time. In addition, even 
where legal prices are slightly higher than black market prices, many con-
sumers are willing to pay a premium to buy a legal, regulated product.98 
Even a poorly implemented version of legalization should, in theory, no-
ticeably reduce the black market. The idea that black market production of a 
product might increase following its legalization is, to put it mildly, counter-
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intuitive. There is a real possibility, however, that this has happened as an 
unintended product of at least some state legalization laws. 
The key to understanding why illegal marijuana cultivation might in-
crease in a state following legalization is “homegrows.”99 Some state legali-
zation laws allow individuals to grow small amounts of marijuana for per-
sonal use. In Colorado, for example, adults can legally grow up to six mari-
juana plants for personal use without a license.100 Although there is a re-
quirement that the marijuana be secured “in an enclosed, locked space,” 
homegrows are largely unregulated.101 Under Oregon’s legalization law, 
adults may grow up to four plants per residence.102 In the medical marijuana 
setting, some states are even more permissive. In Colorado, medical mariju-
ana patients can grow up to 99 plants103 and in California patients are per-
mitted to grow as much marijuana as is “reasonably related to meet his or 
her current medical needs.”104 By contrast, Washington did not legalize 
home cultivation for non-medical users; there, the only way to legally grow 
marijuana for recreational use is if one has a commercial license to do so.105 
In comparison to letting businesses openly manufacture and sell mari-
juana, letting people grow small amounts of marijuana in their homes can 
seem like an insignificant component of state legalization laws. It would be 
tough to make a living out of growing six marijuana plants for export to 
other states, or even for sale locally. Growing marijuana “is much more dif-
ficult than most people understand,” not to mention resource intensive; 
“[t]he investment—in hydroponics, proper lighting, and humidity con-
trols—can be substantial.”106 It would seem, then, that home marijuana cul-
tivation would be left mostly to hobbyists, much like home-brewing by beer 
enthusiasts. Indeed, some legalization skeptics have suggested that states 
consider making it legal to possess and grow small amounts of marijuana 
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while continuing to prohibit commercial sales as a middle ground between 
legalization and prohibition.107 
There is little evidence that small marijuana homegrows that comply 
with state law have become a problem in the states that permit them. There 
is, however, reason to “worry that homegrowers may grow more marijuana 
than they are allowed and present an opportunity to divert product to illegal 
markets in Colorado or markets across state lines.”108 Indeed, this is one 
area where the Rocky Mountain HIDTA report makes a credible case. The 
HIDTA report includes a section with a number of examples of “investiga-
tions involving Colorado marijuana.”109 Many of them involve illegal 
growers attempting to use Colorado’s legalization law as cover for their op-
erations.110 The HIDTA report quotes a DEA agent who describes the prob-
lem of illegal marijuana growers in Colorado: “‘They can kind of hide in 
plain sight . . . . They don’t try to abide by the law in any way. For a while, 
they were going into warehouses. Now they are just going into homes.’”111 
Similarly, in March 2017, Colorado prosecutors brought charges against 16 
people, including some with state licenses, for operating an “alleged pot 
ring” that “used houses and properties in places such as Colorado Springs, 
Castle Rock, Elbert County and Denver to cultivate cannabis and then make 
high-dollar deals to sell it in Illinois, Arkansas, Minnesota and Missouri.”112  
The apparent rise in illegal marijuana cultivation in states like Colora-
do begs the question: why should allowing people to grow small amounts of 
marijuana legally make it any easier to grow, say, sixty plants illegally?113 
Growing marijuana in large amounts is still illegal after all. If anything, it 
might seem that legalizing the cultivation of small amounts would make life 
tougher for large-scale illegal growers. By freeing up resources that the po-
lice might have spent on arresting people for growing a plant or two, the 
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police could put more time into investigating large-scale illegal growers.114 
Of course, it seems just the opposite is happening. 
The reason legalizing small homegrows can help illegal growers “hide 
in plain sight”115 has a lot to do with search and seizure law. Once it is legal 
to grow six marijuana plants, information that someone is growing marijua-
na in a home will not be enough for the police to get a warrant to search the 
house. This is because evidence that someone is growing marijuana no 
longer gives the police probable cause to believe a crime has been commit-
ted.116 Instead, to get a warrant, the police will need some evidence of an 
illegal marijuana grow—a reason to think that the grower is cultivating 
more than six plants. This is no easy task.117 
A 2015 report from the Police Foundation and the Colorado Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police highlights the impact that Colorado’s legalization 
law has had on law enforcement investigative authority.118 According to the 
report, “Colorado police officials interviewed by the Police Foundation said 
one of the biggest concerns for law enforcement is attempting to establish 
probable cause for a search warrant under the conflicting laws regulating 
medical and recreational marijuana.”119 This dynamic makes a state that has 
legalized homegrows an attractive place for an illegal grower to set up shop. 
By making it legal for a person to grow four marijuana plants in her home, 
it becomes harder for the police to catch someone who is illegally growing 
forty plants in her home. The reduced risk of getting caught could give ille-
gal growers in a legalization state substantial advantage over illegal growers 
in prohibition states. 
Even if homegrow legalization has led to an increase in illegal produc-
tion for export, the impact on black market prices is likely to be relatively 
small. It may be easier for illegal marijuana growers to evade detection in 
Colorado than in Nebraska and Oklahoma. They still risk arrest, however, 
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and that risk is priced into the product before they send it out for distribution. 
Black market prices might still decline but not by nearly as much as they 
would if there were widespread diversion of legally produced marijuana. 
Illegal marijuana growing operations in legalization states show that 
the horizontal federalism implications of state marijuana legalization are not 
nearly as straightforward as Nebraska and Oklahoma would have it. The 
narrative that Colorado’s legalization law has flooded neighboring states 
with legally produced marijuana simply does not hold up. There is no evi-
dence that wholesale quantities of legally produced marijuana have been 
smuggled into prohibition states on a widespread basis. And, given the eco-
nomic dynamics and the regulations in place in legalization states, there is 
little reason to believe legal marijuana smuggling will become a significant 
problem anytime soon. To be sure, Nebraska and Oklahoma might still be 
justified in blaming Colorado’s legalization law for a rise in illegally pro-
duced Colorado marijuana coming across the border. The fact that it is 
harder for the police to catch someone illegally growing marijuana in Colo-
rado than it was before is surely an unintended consequence of legalization, 
but it is a consequence nonetheless. If illegal growers are able to more effi-
ciently operate in legalization states like Colorado, this should decrease 
black market prices somewhat in prohibition states, which in turn could po-
tentially increase use in those states. 
Yet that is only half of the story. When it comes to illegal marijuana 
growing operations in Colorado, Colorado is a victim, too. If legally pro-
duced marijuana were being diverted from a legalization state, it might have 
an incentive to look the other way in order to collect the additional tax rev-
enues. By contrast, illegal marijuana grow operations harm the states where 
the cultivation takes place—by causing property120 or environmental121 
damage, for example—without providing much in the way of benefits. In-
deed, in black markets, producer states may very well shoulder significantly 
more costs from illegal production than consumer states do from illegal 
consumption.122 As a result, states like Colorado have as much of an inter-
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est, if not more, in combatting illegal marijuana grows within their borders 
as states like Nebraska and Oklahoma have in stopping exports.123  
Importantly, for purposes of interstate relations, any increase in illegal 
marijuana grows in Colorado is as much a creature of other states’ prohibition 
laws and their inability to stifle demand for marijuana by their residents as it 
is of Colorado’s homegrow provision. If marijuana were legal nationwide or 
if prohibition states were able to effectively stifle demand for marijuana, the 
market for illegally produced marijuana would quickly disappear. The only 
reason it is lucrative for people to use Colorado homes to illegally grow large 
amounts of marijuana for transport and sale across the nation is that other 
states have not yet legalized production themselves.124 So perhaps Colorado 
has as much reason to be upset with Nebraska and Oklahoma as Oklahoma 
and Nebraska have to be upset with Colorado; if Nebraska and Oklahoma 
would adopt their own regulatory scheme for marijuana, Colorado might not 
have to worry about “[o]rganized crime elements with out-of-state ties” mov-
ing in to set up illegal growing operations.125 
CONCLUSION 
States with marijuana legalization laws have begun to worry some of 
their neighbors. This article argues that, as currently constituted, these fears 
are largely misplaced. As constructed, marijuana legalization laws make it 
unlikely that legally produced marijuana will be diverted to other states for 
sale. 
Still, prohibition states’ concerns about marijuana legalization are not 
entirely misplaced. States that permit homegrowing may have, unintention-
ally, made it easier for illegal marijuana growers to hide in plain sight, 
thereby reducing the price of marijuana on the black market. Moreover, if 
legalization laws were not as strict as they are today, smuggling of legally 
produced marijuana into prohibition states could one day become wide-
spread. Prohibition states that hope to prevent against this, however, are not 
well served by trying to turn back time. Barring a dramatic reversal in pub-
lic opinion or a long-shot preemption ruling from the Supreme Court, state 
marijuana legalization laws are not going away. Prohibition states that ac-
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cept this fact can minimize the risk of diversion by lobbying the federal 
government to establish rules that protect their interests. Although it is un-
likely that federal marijuana law will change in the next year or two, at 
some point in the future, Congress will take on the task of reconciling fed-
eral law and state marijuana legalization. If federal law were to take a com-
pletely hands-off approach to marijuana policy, as some advocates have 
argued, it would be very difficult for prohibition states to prevent against 
smuggling from states where it is legal. If, however, states were given the 
option of opting out of federal prohibition only so long as they followed 
certain ground rules,126 prohibition states would have leverage to keep the 
current safeguards against diversion in place and, perhaps, even strengthen 
them.  
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